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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
GENEVA LUMBER COMPANY~ 
Appellant, 
vs .. 
PAYNE AND DAY~ INCL, 
a corporation, 
Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 9075 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff ·brought suit against defendant on an open ac-
COWlt, or in the alternative on a HQu_anturn MenlltH ~ seek-
ing recovery of $7,294.61 claimed to be unpaid for materials 
delivered. At the conclusion of a six day trial~ the Honor .. 
able Joseph E .. Nelson~ Judge of the Fourth District Court 
of Utah Cotu1ty~ granted defendanfs motion to dismissf and 
this appeal was taken from the order of dismissal.. The 
r;miies shall be hereinafter referred to as appellant and 
respondent. 
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Because appellant, in his brief, made but a partial state. 
ment of facts, it will be necessary for us to here make a 
supplementacy statement to complete from the record the 
evidentiary facts upon which appellant has remained silent. 
We agree that on this appeal that the rule of law applicable 
is:r as stated by Justice Worthen in Williams vsJ ZCMij 6 
Utah 2d 283 at Page 285: ~iwe must view- the testimony in 
the light most favorable to plaintiff in determining the cor· 
~ess of the judgment of dismissal at the end of p1ain-
tiff~s case'). However t we believe the rule is applicable· to 
all appellant's evidence~ and not just selected parts of same. 
L~t us proceed to a complete statem.ent of the facts involved. 
The appellant! Payne and DayJ a l:tah Corporatioot dur-
ing the year 1957 contracted for the construction of sixty-
one homes in the Orem-~Provo area for sale to interested 
buyers.. The homes we·re built successively in five differ-
ent groups beginning with a gr9up of ten homes in Rose 
Garden Subdivision at Orem, and when that was completed, 
the remaining four groups of homes were constructed in 
Mount Aire Subdivision, Provo. Respondent employed C. 
E. Slavens as construction superintendent under separate 
contracts covering eaeh group of homes in which his duties~ 
authority and compensation were specifically defined~ (Ex-
hi"bits 20J 21, 22).. The construction superintendent pro-
cured bids from su·bcontractors on the labor and materials 
necessary for the construction of each home in each group, 
presented same to the respondent and same v..~ere accepted 
by it Respondent then attached the bid to a \\o~titten agree-
ment of which it was made a part, one for concrete flat work 
labor and material~ (Exhibit 24), one for framing labor 
through F.H~A. second inspection, (Exhibit 25)~ one for. 
roofing labor and materials, (Exhibits 26 and 27), and one 
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3 
for two packages of building materials in connection with 
each group of homes, (Exhibits 6 through 11). In all of 
these contracts on each group of homes~ the parties fixed 
a single unit home price and respondent inserted in each 
the following provision: 
hit is mutually agreed that any additions or deletions 
in the materials to be furnished are to be given in writ .. 
ing by party of second part (the corporation) to the 
first party, and the value of the change, based upon 
prices quoted in the attached list, shall either be added. 
or subtracted from the original contract.•~ 
We have quoted the provision from the contract ~ 
tween respondent and appe11ant, Geneva Lumber Company 
because we are concerned on this appeal only with those 
contracts. 
Respondent entered into five separate contracts on the 
five groups of homes in questiont the first is dated Febru~ 
ary 2lt 1957, and it covered ten homes in Rose Garden Sub-
division, Orem, {Exhibit 6)) the next is dated March 16~ 
1957~ and it covered eleven homes in Mount Aire Subdivi .. 
sion, Provo, (Exhibit 10), the next was made June 3, 1957, 
and it covered sixteen homes in Mount Aire Subdivision, 
Provo~ (Exhibit 8), the next is dated July 26, 1957, and it 
covered eleven homes in Mount Aire SUbdivisionJ Provo, 
(Exhbit 7), and one dated SeptemJber 3+ 1957t covering 
twelve homes in the Mount Aire Subdivision, Provo, (Ex-
hibit 9). There was also a contract beh.veen the same par ... 
ties dated September 23, 1957 ~ covering one hmne in the 
Western Mail or Subdivision~ Orem~ (Exhibit 11) . These 
contracts all incorporated appellant's bids for fu.mishjng 
all materials necessary for the construction Gf each home 
unit through first and second F.H.A inspections. With the 
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exception of the designation of the group of homes cavered~ 
these contracts contained substantially identical provisions 
and for that reason we \ViU refer to appellant's Exhibit 6 to 
llustrate the contract provisions. 
Exhibit 6 covers the Rose Garden group of homes at 
Orem. It provides that appellant shall fill'nish materials for 
plan No. 485, Schemes 1, 2J and 3, as per '-tattached lists~', 
which become a part of the agreement '' for the price of 
$2,116JMY'. It required the specified grade and quality in-
dicated by the list and deivery within 15 days after being 
ordered ·by the respondent. The attached lists are entitled 
~~Building Material List for Three Bedroom House-Garage 
plan \Vith gaJbled front porch plan 485, Package No. J .. 
Schemes 1 ~ 2, 3 .• , This list then specifies in detail the num-
ber of unts and the kinds and quality of materials necessary 
to complete the package and prices out each unit and shor\.vs 
a package number 1 total net price of $1610.00~ Then fol-
lows a list similarly titled for '~package No~ 2~ schedules 1, 
2, and 3~" likewise detailing the materials and showi.ng the 
net price for pa:ckage No-~ 2 of $506.00~ The contract then 
provides for the above quoted writing in case there are any 
additions or deletions in the list It is further provided that 
materials shall be stacked on the jobsite in good order and 
in accordance with the superintendent's instructions; that 
the ·contract pri.'Ce shall hold for ninety days at which time 
adjustments shall be made in accordance with current mar~ 
ket prices; that respondent will purch.Me the material at 
the named price as needed; that payment for n1a-teriaJs de-
livered is to be made on the lOth of the month following 
delivery to the 27th of the preceding month; Hthat delivery. 
will be made and billed by package number as per attached 
listu; and the agreement rovers the ten houses in Rose Gar~ 
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den Subdivision. The houses d£~"SCribed in this contract were 
built and the parties fully performed their agreement. 
On March 28~ 1957~ appellant, Geneva Lumber Com-
pany, billed respondent for. materials furnished as called 
for in package No. 1 under the contract, Exhtbit 6~ which 
comprised the framing materials taking each house up to 
first F.H4A. inspection. A receipt dated April 10~ 1957, for 
$16,100.00 was thereupon given by appellant to respondent 
in payment for the materials in package 1~ (Exhi1bit 12). 
Alsot on April 10~ 1957, appellant executed and delivered 
to respondent a receipt on each home unit described in Ex-
Whit 6 for the sum of $1610.00 reciting that it was '•In full 
payment for materials furnished'' as required ·by package 
1 of Exh~bit 6. Likewise on April 27, 1957, appellant billed 
respondent for materials furnished in package No. 2 on 
each house Wlit described in Exhibit 6 and on May 10. 1957, 
gave a separate receipt and lien waiver acknowledging pay-
ment in full for each unit package No. 2 materials as re-
quired by the contractt Exhibit 6t (Exhibit 12; Tr. 9()..93}. 
Identical contracts were made between these same parties 
on each of the other groups of homes (Exhibits 7 t 8, 9, 10~ 
and 11) pursuant to which appellant furnished the mate. 
rials called for by package 1 and package 2 for each unit 
and gave receipts in full on each home unit for all materials 
furnished for same~ as well as lien waivers thereon. (Ex:-
hibits 13 A and B, 14 A, B:r and Ct 15 A, B~ and C~ 16 A, B, 
C and D). 
Three months after the date of the last contract (ap-
pellant's Exhibit 11) and after all of the contracts had been 
fully perfonnedt including those of the general superinten-
dent, C. E4 Slavens~ respondent corporation received a com-
munication from Slavens (Exhibit 31) dated January 27, 
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1958, enclosing a statement from a-ppellant for '~extras on 
the 73 homes~' in the amount of $8398 .. 30,. and which in .. 
eluded documents in the nahlre of itemized statemen~ in 
which Slavens stated hi need not say that the entire hill is 
utterly ridiculous't. Although the appellant did not send 
this statement directly to the respondent~ but rather,. sent 
sa·me to Slavens, who no longer was employed by respond-
ent and was then in Blanding, Utah, and this was the first 
notice respondent had ·been given that appellant was mak-
ing claim for extras Wide-r the contracts in question~ (Tr. 
101-102). Appellant,. John Davis~ admitted on cross ex-
amination, that ·he was well aware of the contract prov:i-
sion (Tr. 339 .. 340) requiring a '•writing if there were any 
additions or deletions~', and that he tried to get respondent 
on the telephone for the ptwpose of procuring the writing 
but was tmable to do so, (Tr4 337-339) 4 He also admitted 
that no writing was procured from the respondent author-
izing any of the additions of materials which he claims to 
have fw~ished. Slavens denied that he ever told appeilant 
that the required writing would not be necessary, (Tr. 418)~ 
Slavens did admit receiving, on or about July 1~ 1957t a 
statement from appellantt (Exhibit 19) for $623.36 for ex-
tras on ucherry Lane Project~ (Tr. 419) t and that he talked 
to appellant, John Davis:r wife and she told him it was sent 
oilt by mistaket (Tr. 440). The original complaint was filed 
on ·May 28t 1958, and the amount of appellantts claim stated 
therein is S8 t398 .. 30, but after the taking of the depositions 
of Slavens and respondent in July of 1958~ he filed the 
amended complaint reducing the amount of the clajm to 
$7!294.61, (Tr. 370-371).. We point this out to show the 
nebulous character of appellant's claim, which was appar-
ently confusing to appellant himse1ft (Tr. 419-420) . 
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AppeJlant offerecl, as evidence of his claimed extras 
allegedly furnished respondent in the construction of the 
five groups of homes:P three paper-back bookst (Exhibits 
1~ 2 and 3} containing numerous undated entries of maf.e.. 
rials claimed to have been fttrnish-ed as '~additions'~ to the 
lists attached to the con trtcts, (Exhibits 6, 7 ~ 8, 9~ 10 and 
11). The tabs attached to Exhibits 1, 2t and 3, the red pen-
ciling and the crosses appearing therein were added by the 
witnesses who identified same. Respondent made timely ob-
jections to Exhibits 1~ 2 and 3, and all oral evidence going 
to the identification and explanation of same, and also to 
appellant's Exhi1bits 4 and 5, summarizing the reasoning 
process employed by the witnesses, making conclusions 
from the entries in the three books as to prices and mate-
rials. Respondent,s objection to this evidenee was made 
on the ground that its admission would be a violation of the 
parol evidence rule in view of the ~~additions and deletions~• 
provision contained in the contracts in question, and on the 
further ground that the evidence was self-serving and im-
materialt (Tr. 288). The court admitted this evidence ''for 
'vhat it is worth"~ (Tr. 40). 
Appellant usd the date of the making of the contracts 
6 through 11 respectively, to fix the time when the alleged 
extras were furnished and thus ties Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
directly into the contracts mentioned~ (Tr. 38). Thus, the 
appellant dates the alleged delivery of materials by reason-
ing that this nebulous mass must have 1been furnished at the 
veey time appellant was furnishing materials under the 
above mentioned contracts, and in violation of the ~'addi­
tions~' -provision of same+ 
Appellant clahned that respondentJs construction super· 
intendent~ C. E.. Slavens~ authorized the appellant to fur-
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nish the claimed extras appearing in Exhibits 1, 2, and 3~ 
(Tr. 8-9-20), but there is no evidence in the record that 
Slavens had any such authority, either express or implled. 
Nmnerous attempts were made by appellant to prO\fe Sla-
vens' authority by some statement he was alleged to have 
made. The court, hrn.vever, sustained our objection to this 
kind of evidence on the ground that agency cannot be proved 
by oral s~tements af the alleged agent1 (Tr. 143-144; 162-
163) L The authority of Slavens to hind respondent is shoom 
by the contra.ct:s under which he was employed. In fa{_t, 
respondent required a contract \\7!th each of the persons 
who had any part in the construction of the homes in ques.. 
tiont ·whether it be for the flat concrete work, the roofingr 
the construction labor, or the furnishing of materials. In 
each such case~ rspondent protected itself as far as ~~addi· 
tions and deletions' 1 were concerned by the above quoted 
contractual provision appearing in each contract. 
We believe that under the foregoing facts~ vie-wed in 
a light most favorable to appellant~ the provisions of the 
.contracts covering the construction O!f" the 61 homes in ques--
tion~ and particularly that provision in each pertaining to 
the requirement of a writing from respondent in the event 
that Hadditions and dele-tionsn were 1nade, and the law appli-
cable to the .situation here, the court properly and correctly 
granted respondent's motion to dismiss at the close of ap-
pellan tJ s ca..c;e. 
The contracts for the construction of the homes in 
question {Exhibits 6 through 11) provided for the furnish-
ing of materials referred to in ea<~h contract as package 1 
and package 2~ The court properly received evidence as 
to· the- meaning of these package provisions. Slavens was 
experienced in this ''package method'' of construction a.i ld 
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was qualified to explain the '~packaget' bids which appellant 
\Vas called upcm to make to the respondent. The package 
1 lists attached to each contract called for the framing rna .. 
teria.ls necessary to construct the individual home tmits to 
the point of the first F.H.A. inspectiont and package 2 lists 
called for materials sufficient to take same to second F. 
H.A. inspection. Slavens explained that in each package 
there was a 10~'C mal"k-up leway~ that is to say~ 10% more 
materials were specified in the lists than "vere actually 
needed in the construction~ (Tr .. 392-390).. Slavens further 
testified that the 1 ists could not be absolutely accurate in 
specifying the exact amount of materials that would be re-
quired to carry the construction to the first and second in-
spection of F .. H .. A.t and hence the said lQ~,h leeway provided 
against possible shortages. Under the package method em-
ployed in these contracts the appellant delivered the neces-
sary materials to the jobsite and there wa:s always mate-. 
rials left over upon completion of each of the five projects, 
(Tr. 93-100: 405-407).. Respondent never claimed credit 
for the overages, although they were substantial in each 
case, because appellant owned the overages which resulted 
in this way.. Upon completion of each job Wlder each con ... 
tractt the appel1ant caused the materials left OV"er to be 
inventoried and subtracted from the next succeeding pro-
ject. This was true upon completion of Rose Garden, and 
the four succeeding groups of homes at Mount Aire and in 
each instance the appellant took credit for substantial 
amotmts of materials which were not used in the preceding 
project. 
Our position with respect to appellant"s argument in 
his brief, and for the affirmance of the judgment, follows. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY CONDUCf ON 
THE PART OF RESPONDENT UPC)N \VHICH O)Ul..D 
BE BASED ~~wAIVERt~ OR '~ESTOPPEL"'t OF TH1E CON-
TRAcruAL REQUlREMENT THAT r~M)DITIONS AKD 
DELETIONS'' IN Iv!ATERIALS TO BE FURNISHED 
WERE TO BE AUTHORIZED IN WRITING BY RE-
SPONDENT, AND THE PROFERRED EVIDENCE ON 
THIS POINT VIOLATES THE PAROL EVIDENCE 
RULE. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S CONSTRUCTION SUPERINTEN-
·DENT, C4 E4 SLAVENS, HAD NEITHER ACTUAL NOR 
A·PP ARENT AUTHORITY TO ALTER ANY PROVISION 
OF RESPONDENT'S CONTRACTS VVITH APPELLANT~ 
AND PARTICULARLY THE PROVISION WITH RE-
SPECT TO ~'ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS"'). 
POINT III 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE WAS NOT VIQ.. 
LA TED BY RESPONDENT SHOVVIN.-G THE MEANING 
OF. THE PACKAGE 1\1ETHOD OF FURNISlllNG MA-
TERIALS AS PROVIDED IN THE ORIGINAL CON-
TRACTS. 
POD'lT IV 
. THE BILLINGS, THE PAYMENTS, TiiE RECEIPrS-
IN FULL AND LIEN WAIVERS WERE ALL MADE BY 
THE upACKAGE') AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTRA.CfS., 
AND THERE WAS NO NEED FOR APPELLANT TO 
EXPLAIN ANY OF THESE DOCUMENTS~ 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY CONDUC'r ON 
THE PART OF RESPONDENT UPON \VHICH COULD 
BE BASED 4'WAIVER" OR ~~ESTOPPELn OF THE CON-
TRACI'UA·L REQUIREMENT THAT ~-&ADDITIONS AND 
DELETIONS'' IN I\.iA.TERl.Al.S TO BE FURNISHED 
WERE TO BE AUTHORIZED IN \VRITING BY RE-
SPONDENT~ AND THE PROFERRED EVIDENCE ON 
THIS POINT VIOLATES THE PAROL EVIDENCE 
RULE. 
Appellant's argument under Point I of his brief p~ 
ceeds upon the assumption that respondent's construction 
superintendentt Slavens, had authority to waive the con-
tractual provision requiring a "'tVriting from respondent in 
the event of Hadditions and deletions~' of materials under. 
the contracts. We believe that no such assumption is war· 
ranted under the e\1dence in this case.. We do not quarrel 
with the point of law cited under Point I in appellant's brief .. 
We assert~ however, that there is no fact appearing in this 
record to which the rule can be applied~ Appellant relies 
on the oral statement which he claims Slavens made at 
Geneva's office in July of 1957, denied by Slavens~ about 
keeping a separate record of the claimed extras and keep-
ing it secret from respondent. It is argued. that this amoun ... 
ted to appellant and respondent entering into an oral agree-
ment to waive the writing require-ment provision for extras 
contained in the said contractsr Alsot appellant apparently 
seeks to have the principle of estoppel apply because when 
he says he attempted to get in touch with respondent, he 
was unable to do so. At least~ appellant admits that he 
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12 
knew well what the provision concerning additions and de-
letions was~ and that it was necessary to get in touch \vith 
the respondent corporate officers and procure a writing 
in the event extras were necessary. However, an agrot~s 
authority oannot be shown by a reliance on oral declara-
tion the agent is supposed to hi:ive made. The applicable 
rule as stated in A.L.I. Restatement: Agency, Section 285 
is as follov;s: 
~ .. Eviden-ce of a statement by an agent concerning the 
existence or extent of his authority is not admissible 
against the principal to prove its existence or extent, 
unless it appears by other evidence that the making 
of such statement was VIi thin the authority of the agent 
orJ as to persons dealing with the agent, within the 
apparent authority or other power of the agent."~ 
See also 2 American Jurisprudence.. Section 445; and 
3 AL.R. 2d 602 where it is said: 
''In cases too numerous to be exhaustively collected the 
proposition has been annormced that as against the 
principal, ev-idence of extrajudicial statements of an 
alleged agent is not admissible to show the fact of 
agncy or the extent or scope thereof.~~ 
It is upon such oral declarations that appellant relies 
and Wider the 1aw such reliance cannot be had. It is appel-
lant. rather~ who should be estopped to assert such a flimsy 
claim as he is malting upon the ground that he at all ti-mes 
relied upon the contractst billed respondent at the couclu-
sion of each and was paid according to the billing and rn-
cei·pted respondent for full payment of all of the materials 
furnished under all of the said contracts~ AppeUant seems 
to have conspired with Slavens to keep secret what was go-
ing on conceming the claimed extras all during the period 
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from Febtuary 1957 until November of 1957t when all of 
these contracts were being performedJ and then some 
three months later made claim that he had furnished ex-
tras despite the ,. additions and deletions~' provisions of said 
contracts. 
All through the trial it was respondenes position that 
appelant's attempt to adduce oral evidence concerning his 
claimed extras, was a violation of the parol evidence rule 
because it was an attempt to vary the terms of the written 
contract. Apparently the trial court, at the close of the 
trial, reached the conclusion that this was what appellant 
was attempting to do. The rule on which we relied is stated 
in 3 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Section 1484 as fol-
lows: 
'
1All conversations and parol agreements between the 
parties prior to a written agreement are so merged 
therein that they cannot be given in evidence for the 
purpose of changing the contract or showing an inten-
tion or understanding different from that expressed 
in the written agreement.' 1 
In the "'Model Code of Evidence~' of the 1'American 
Law Instituteu Dean Mason Lad~ commenting on the code at 
page 35 5, states that~ 
'~In its brief space1 it covers all of the Ia w of evidence 
except parol evidence rule, which is regarded as a rule 
of substitutive law rather than as a rule of evidence."'" 
The practical importance of the application of the rule 
in written contract like the one in the case at bar is stated 
in Jenkins Used cars vs. Rice (1958) 7 Utah 2d, 276, 277~ 
323 P. 2d 259~ by this Court as follo\vs: 
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uBut it is also clementary and of extreme practical im-
portance that we hold contracting parties to their clear 
and nnderstandable language deliberately committed to 
writing and endorsed by them as signatories thereto~ 
Were this not so business, one with another among our 
citizens~ would be relegated to the chaotic~ and the 
basic purose of the law to supply enforceable rules of 
conduct for the maintenaru."e' and im-provement of an 
orderly society~s welfare and progress would find itself 
impotent. It is not unrasonable to hold one respon-
sible for language which he himself espouses. Such 
language is the only implement he gives us to fashlon 
a detenrunation as to the intentions of the parties. U n-
der such circwnstances we should not be required to 
embosom any request that w-e ignore that very lang-
uage. This is as it should be. The rule excluding mat-
ters outside the fotll' comers of a clearl' understand-
able docwnent:~ is a fair one, and one's contentions con-
cerning his intent should extend no further than his 
own clear expressions. t" 
The respondent corporation was in a large building 
enterprise and the corporate officers did not have direct 
supervision of the work. For that reason it employed a 
construction superintendent and gave him supervisory au-
thority only. Respondent also nmde separete contracts 
with all the other subcontractors who participated in any 
way in the construction, among which appellant had 
the written contracts for furnishing materials under the 
package method of contracting+ Respondent had a right 
to protect itself f1~om claims fur extras and did so by in-
serting jn each contract the provjs.ion with respect to uaddi-
tions and deletions"~- We do not th-ink appellant can arrange 
with anyone to circumvent such written provision requir~ 
ing written authority for the furnishing of any extras, rely 
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upon the contracts, receive payment and receipt in full for 
materials furnished under same and then after complete 
performance for the first time make these surprise claims 
that extras had been furnish-ed... We believe the evidence 
shows the claim is wholly \Vithout merit~ and that the court 
rightly granted our motion to dismiss at close of appellanfs 
case. 
POINT II 
RFSPONDENT~S COXSTRUCTION SUPERINTEN-
DENT,. C .. E~ SLA.VENS.~ HAD NEITHER ACTl.JAL NOR 
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ALTER AN"Y PROVISION 
OF RESPONDENT~S CONTRACfS WITH APPELLANT, 
AND PARTICULARLY THE PROVISION WITH RE-
SPECT TO hADDITIONS OR DELETIONSH+ 
In his Point II, appelJant clai·ms that Slavens had actual 
or apparent authority to change the provisions of the con-
tract in question~ He cites the record (Tr. 299) showing 
alleged statements by Slavens that he had authority to do 
so.. Appellant then oomplains that the trial court conunitted 
error in ordering such alleged oral statements stricken from 
the record on the grounds that the extent of an agenes au-
thority cannot be shown by his voluntary declarations. He 
claims these statements were admissible as part of the 
res gtsfae and cites authorities on pages 14 and 15 of his 
brief to sustain this position. An examination of these au~ 
thorities sho\v conclusively that they do not apply and do 
not sustain appellant's position in that regard. For ex· 
ample~ he cites A.L+I~ Restatement: Agency Section 284~ 
which is as fo1Iows: 
''In actions between the principal and third persons, evi-
dence of a statement by an agent is admissi-ble for or 
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against either party for the pwpose of proving that 
such statement \\raE made, if the fact that the state-
ment was made constitutes~ or is relevant in the proof 
of~ one of the ultimate facts required to .. be established 
In order to maintain a cause of action or defense .. '' 
It is apparent that this rule of law applies where it is 
a matter between ''principal and third per.sonsn and not as 
in the instant case~ ~between the parties to the written con-
tract itself.. The case of Park vs. Moorman Mfg. Co .. J 121 
Utah 311, 241 Pac .. 2d 914, (citd App. Br. 14) involved the 
authority of an agent to make a warranty binding upon his 
principal in dealing with a thlrd party.. It was held that 
the agent from whom the authority came was the general 
sales agent of the company and had authority to make the 
representation to a third party from Whom he was soliciting 
business. Also the Union Century Life Assurance vs. Glas-
cock, 110 SW 2d 681, 270 KY. 750~ 114 A.L.R. 373, also 
involved statements made by the agent to a third party 
and not to one of the parties to a written agreement, as in 
the case at bar. We believe that an examination of these 
cases shows that appellant has misconceived the applicable 
law here, for all of the authorities cited apply to the third 
party situation. 
The record shows that res{Xlndent hired Slavens Wlder 
a written contract to supervise the construction of the build· 
ing prcje-2L In all of the contracts made by respondent for 
the l~bor and materials that went into the construction, it 
provided that a writing was required in the event there were 
~~additions or deletions'~ needed. Although appellant well 
kne\v of this provision, he proceeded in the teeth of it to 
secretly make some claimed deal about extras with Slavens 
in \\1hi ch SJ avens is alleged to have lnade the alleged state-
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ments a bout his authority. The f arthffit ~ ppe-1 lant geems 
to have gone to procure the required writing, according to 
his 0\VIl testimony1 was to make an attempt to get in touch 
\vith res}X)ndent and which he never really accomplished. 
Exhibit 19, dated July lt 1957j \vas never sent to re---
spondent and no such claim \Vas ever disclosed to respond-
ent dtrring con~truction. All of the contracts in question 
made it clear to Slavens and the appeila.Jlt as well as of all 
the su bcontractorst that if any extra 1nn.terials or labor 
\Vere neededt authority to put them into the project had 
to be procured from respoodent in writing~ This is not a 
case where respondent~s construction superintendent was 
making representation about his autl1ority to some third 
party to procure materials. The most that can be made 
out of appeHant's claim is~ if the same were taken to be 
true, that he secretly furnished Slavens materials which he-
calls extras without ever contacting respondent at any 
time during the existence of the contracts in questioiL How-
ever, appellant relied upon and tied his claimed extras into 
each one of the contracts in question, a~cepting payments 
and receipting same in fullt and several months after such 
rom.plte performance, he asserts a claim for extras. Sig-
nificantly~ he did not send the cla i n1 to the respondent, but 
rather mailed it to Slavens, who had completed his con-
tract and was working in Monticello~ Utah+ He \\·ants us 
to be-lieve that respondent indulged in some conduct from 
which it can be inferred that Slavens had actual or appar-
ent authority to do what appellant claims he did. We sub-
mit that the statements made by Slavens in his letter of 
January 27~ 1958~ attached to Exhibit 31t correctly reflects 
the situation when he said "I need not say that the entire 
bjU is utterly ridiculous,'. We submit that the trial court 
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made no error in excluding the profeiTed oral declaration 
of an agent whose authority was limited by all of the con-
tracts in question and his order doing so should be sus-
taine(t 
POINT III 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE WAS NOT VIQ. 
LATED BY RESPONDENT SHOWING THIE MEANING 
OF THE PACKAGE METHOD OF FURNISIDNG :MA-
TERIALS AS PROVIDED IN THE ORIGINAL CON-
TRACTS. 
In this particular, appellant claims in his brief~ that 
because Slavens was permitted to explain a term contained 
in the contracts in question and show from his experience 
the meaning of the j"paekage methocl.'~ of buildingt the parol 
evidence rule was violated. It is our position that this is 
not so because ex·planation of contract terms can be made 
without any violation of the rule. As is stated in A.L.L 
Restatement: Contracts, Section 230~ 
liThe standard of interpretation of an integration} ex-
cept where it produces an ambiguOlLS result~ or is ex-
cluded by a rule of law establishing a definite meaning~ 
is the meaning that would be attached to the integra-
tion by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with 
all ope-rative usages and knowing aU the circumstances 
prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the 
integration, other than oral statements by the parties 
of what they intended it to mean.') 
See ibid Section 228 as to integration being writing. 
See also 20 American Jurisprudence 994, Section 1142. 
Each of the contracts in question called for rna terials 
for each home unit by ''packages"~ AppellantJs claim for 
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extras involved the interpretation or meaning of the term 
"package''. Indeed, appellant first raised the question on 
dir~t. ex a.mination of Slavens ( Tr. 225-226) \vhe re counsel 
had hi n1 testify that the specified materials in the 'oipack-
ages~' called for materials in excess of the amonnt required 
to complete the package. This examination by counsel is 
as follO\vs: 
(By Mrr Sorensen) 
Q~ oi'Do you know how Art Riley would under-
stand how to get the hinges if they were not on the 
package list? 
A. Yes 
Q. How would he knmv that? 
A. Because he needed them. 
Q. Needed them and therefore he knew it; is that 
your testi~mony today? 
A. They kn€'\.V the material on the package~ 
Q. H<)l\\=' did they know th~t? 
A. Because of the package system of buying. 
Q. What about the materials that were not on 
the package? 
A. That was taken care of by the fact there were 
overages or material. 
Q~ Show me any overages of material in the con-
tract, Mr. Slavens. 
A. Right beret I can sho\v you. 
Q. You show me. 
A. 30 pounds of 16 box nails. 
Q. W·hich exhibit? 
A~ Each and very one. I went through and 
checked them. In other words-
(Discussion between Counsel} 
Q~ (By Mr~ Sorensen) Which item are you talk-
ing about? 
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A.. 16 box nails and~ 
Shall we use any one of them? 
Q. For the record, I draw your attention to Ex-
hibit 5.. Do you lmow of your own knowledge how 
many 16-penny box nails were in fact required by Ex-
hibits 6 to 11 inclusive? 
A. Yes 
Q. How many? 
A.. 70 pounds per house and there- is 100 pounds 
per house on the list. 
Q. Have you gone through the contracts and to-
taled wh·at the contracts called for? 
~ y~ ~ 
Q. What figure did you come up with as the total 
for all projects. Exhibits 6 to 11 inclusive? 
A. If the 61 houses-
Q. AllS'\Ver my question. 
{Discussion between Counsel) 
A. 6100 pounds.J' 
Despite the foregoing direct exam-ination, counsel for 
appellant objected repeatedly and strenuously to our fur-
ther interrogating Slavens on cross examination concern-
ing the meaning of the .. 'packaget' term used in these con-
tracts, (Tr. 393-399}~ The court's ruling on these objec .. 
tions was sound~ both from the p)int of view that contract 
terms may be explained \Vithout violating the parol evi-
dence rule~ and also that the matter opened up on direct 
examination by appellant, it was proper to permit further 
exploration of the same subject on cross exam·inatioo. 
Also, we submit that appellant well understood that 
upon completion of each of the contracts in question, that 
there were overages from the material lists making up the 
packages in each contract. Appellant's son testified on 
cross examination of these overages for whieh appellant 
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took creditr (Tr. 93-100). So that the 10~ ... (. leeway testi-
fied to by Slavens produced substantial overages for which 
plaintiff took credit by deducting this quantity of overage 
materials from the package lists reqttircd for the succeed· 
ing contract group. These overages more than covered 
appellant's claimed extras and indicate that he was more 
than paid in full for all of the claimed extra materials. 
In any event we submit that appellant's Point III is 
not well taken and Slavens' testimony did not violate the 
parol evidence rule .. 
POINT IV 
THE BILLINGSjl THE PAYMENTS, THE RECEIPTS 
IN FLJLL AND LIEN WAIVERS WERE ALL MADE BY 
THE '~PACKAGE'~ AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTRACTSf 
AND THERE WAS NO NEED FOR APPELLANT TO 
EXPLAIN ANY OF THESE DOCUMENTS~ 
In his Brieft Point IV, appellant seeks to shlft the em-
phasis from the contracts in question to what he called "1lien 
waivers'J in order to duck the parol evidence rule. He ar-
gues that the contracts in question were all complied with 
by appellant in the matter of the delivery of materials called 
for by packages 1 and 2, the billings for materials contained 
ll1 each package, and the execution and delivery of the so-
cai1ed ~'nen waivers'~, each of whieh contained the provision 
~'received of Payne & Day, Inc. (dollar amormt) in full pay-
ment for materials furnished by the undersigned for and in 
corutection "With the construction and improvements at 
(description}''.. He further argues that the contracts were 
thus relied upon by appe.Jlant for all the units covered by 
them~ Again we call attention to the fact that the claimed 
extras were claimed to have been furnished in connection 
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with the construction of each of the homes covered by each 
of these contracts.. Furthermore. it should be remembered 
that in each of the said contracts, there was the provision 
requiring a writing from the respondent for all uadditions 
and deletionB~' of materials to be ftunished. Apparently in 
order to evade the effect of this provisionj they argue that 
the so-called ~'lien waivers'' were explained by the witn.esst 
Davis~ to be ~'for the materials listed on the written con-
tracts only''. We believe such argument to be specious and 
not justifi·able on facts in this record or under the law appli-
cable thereto. 
The documents to which apellant refers~ in fact~ were 
primarily receipts signed by appellant for payment in full 
for all materials furnished, and the ~~lien waivers~' contained 
therein are an additional evidence of this fact There is 
no need for explanation of the documents because th.ere is 
no ambiguity in the .same.. It is not this receipt and ' 11ien 
waiv~, which we contend the parol evidence rule appli.efi 
to. It is rather the contracts (Exhibits 6 through 11) which 
appellant seeks to vary by parol evidence in viomtion of that 
rule. The ~'lien waivers'' are merely an evidence of the per-
formance of the contract in question~ Appellantts entire 
claim is based upon these contra~, even to the reliance on 
the date of each to establish the time when he allegedly 
delivered the claimed extras.. He acknowledges the con-
tracts and all of their tenn.s and his performance of same, 
but \vhen jt comes to the contractual provision requiring 
a writing with respect to ~-'addi tioru; and deletions',, he re-
pudiates the contracts and asks the Court to help him vio-
late sa me. Thinking to better his positiont he shifts a way 
from the contracts in question and rushes to the so-called 
~~uen \vaiver.":;'", claiming that they need explanation~ al-
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though they are clea1· and unambiguoust jn order to avoid 
the parol evidence rule which clearly prevents him from 
varying the terms of the written contracts. 
The contracts in question required the delivery of ma-
terials called for in package 1 and package 2 for each home 
Wlit. 'The lists for each package on each unit contained a 
10 ~~}· leeway or overage of required materiat Appellant 
delivered these materials called for, made billings for each 
package on each of the unit~, received and acknowledged 
payment in full of each package on each of the W1its and 
executed lien waivers covering same. During all of the 
time that the contracts in question were being performed~ 
appellant was secretly arranging \vith Slavens~ according 
to his testimony, which was denied by Slavens, building up 
extras to be asserted against respondent at some future 
time.. Not until several months after all of the contracts 
had been completely performed and appellant had receipted 
in full payment for all materials called for by him~ appellant 
asserted the claim against Slavens, and respondent had no 
knowledge of it until three months after the constn.tction 
was completed. All through the trial~ respondent objected 
to the only proferred evidence in support of appellant's 
clahn relying upon the provision of the contracts in ques-
tion which required appellant to procure a writing from re-
spondent covering any extras furnished~ The court, in con-
sidering the evidence submitted by appellant in support of 
his claim, was of the opinion that~ viewing same in the light 
most favorable to appellant~ it did not esta·blish his claim 
for extras and granted respondent).s motion to dismiss. '\Ve 
believe in so doing the court followed the facts which de-
veloped at the trial, and the law as applied to those facts~ 
and conunitted no error~ 
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CONCLUSION 
On this record, viewing the evidence most favorable to 
appellant, the court did not connnit error because: (1) 
the uadditions and deletions" provision was a term of writ-
ten contracts and CIJppellant' s prof erred oral evidence lJii.o.. 
lated the parol eviden-ce rule as an attempt to vary same; 
(2) respondent's constru'Ction superintendent had no au-
thority~ eAl)ress or implied, to waive the contractual pro-
vision concerning ~~additions or deletions:Pt) nor was there 
any grounds upon whieh estoppel could be applied against 
respondent relying on said provision; (3) explanation of 
the contract term ~~package'' by respolll.dent's witness was 
not a violation of the parol evidence rule; and (4) the par-
ties having fully performed the written contracts in ques-
tion and appellantj' having been paid in full for all materials 
furnished theretmder, cannot thereafter legally base a claim 
on oral evidence which varies the terms of the written agree-
ments. We respectfully urge that the order granting re-
spondent's motion to dismiss be sustained and affirmed .. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE S. BALLIF 
GEORGE E. BALLIF 
For BALLIF & BALLIF 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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